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 Good afternoon. My name is Allan Hunt, and I am the Assistant Executive 
Director of the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in Kalamazoo, Michigan. The 
Upjohn Institute has operated as an independent, non-profit organization devoting its 
resources to finding and promoting solutions to employment-related issues at the 
regional, state, national, and international levels since 1945.   
The broad objectives of the Institute=s research and grant programs are to:  
 
1) link scholarship, evaluation, and experimentation with 
issues of public and private employment and 
unemployment policy;  
 
2) bring new knowledge to the attention of policymakers 
and decision makers; and  
 
3) make knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful in 
their applications to the solutions of employment and 
unemployment problems.  
 
While the major support for Institute research and publication programs comes 
from our endowment, the Institute also engages in selected contract research, where the 
Institute believes the work is in the public interest.  In fiscal year 2003, about 16 percent 
of the Research Division budget of $5.0 million came from such external sources. 
Those sources include the U. S. Department of Labor. Last year the Employment 
Standards Administration funded a “Program Effectiveness Study” of the FECA program 
by ICF Consulting under a GSA Contract (Schedule GS-23F-8182H).  
I served as a Subject Matter Expert (SME) under that contract and participated in 
the study as both an advisor and investigator. I also made a field visit to the Dallas 
District Office of OWCP. I am not here today to give a full report on that study, but will 
try to provide some comparative context for the FECA program by using data from the 
state and provincial workers’ compensation systems in the United States and Canada, 




Workers’ Compensation Systems 
As you are probably aware, there are only three countries in the world that have 
established sub-national workers’ compensation systems for workers disabled by their 
employment: Australia, Canada, and the United States. Over the last 29 years, I have 
accumulated significant research experience in all three of these countries, and in the 
different types of workers’ compensation systems that they present. Let me summarize 
that experience by simply saying it is very difficult to make any performance 
comparisons among systems, and it is nearly impossible to say anything that is 
universally “true” for all workers’ compensation systems.  
Nevertheless, my assignment for the ICF study was to try and develop some 
benchmarks for FECA system performance. Together with my colleague, Professor Peter 
Barth of the University of Connecticut, I also wrote a chapter on “Promising Practices in 
Workers’ Compensation” for the ICF report. That chapter sought to identify new ideas 
from other workers’ compensation systems that might be implemented in the FECA 
program.  
 There are three main objectives for a workers’ compensation system:  
1) Prevention; 
2) Compensation; and 
3) Rehabilitation and Return to Work.  
If prevention is successful, and no injury occurs, there is nothing to compensate; and, of 
course, no need for rehabilitation. However, if prevention fails and a disabling injury 
does occur, there are a host of issues that arise in the appropriate compensation of 
workplace injuries and illnesses. Depending upon the nature of the injury, there may be 
very complex and contentious issues involved in determining what sort of rehabilitation 
is needed and what would be an appropriate return to work under the circumstances.  
 Government’s role in these sub-national systems generally consists of some 
combination of the following four functions: 
1) to provide oversight of the system, including policy expertise; 
2) to determine the benefits that will be provided; 
3) to regulate or provide an insurance mechanism; and 
4) to provide dispute resolution services.  
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Dispute resolution mechanisms are usually required because of a fundamental design 
challenge in workers’ compensation systems. The benefits are paid to injured workers, 
while the costs are paid by employers. This places workers’ compensation in the realm of 
labor-management relations, with all that entails. The insurer (whether private or public) 
is caught in the middle, and the government provides a neutral referee for the resolution 
of the inevitable disputes.  
 One of the main structural differences among workers’ compensation systems is 
in the nature of the insurance mechanism. In all Canadian provinces and five U.S. states 
(North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming – the so-called 
“exclusive fund” states), a public fund is the only authorized insurer for workers’ 
compensation. In the rest of the U.S. states, private insurance is allowed, frequently in 
competition with a non-exclusive public fund. In addition, self-insurance is generally 
allowed for large, financially secure employers, with more or less restrictive access 
depending upon the jurisdiction. Approximately half the states have competitive public 
funds, and they are the dominant insurer in a handful of those states.  
In the U.S., private insurance carriers accounted for 55 percent of all benefits paid 
in 2001, with self-insurers at 23 percent and state funds at 16 percent. All federal 
workers’ compensation programs (FECA, Black Lung, LHWA, and EEOICA) account 
for the remaining six percent of the total. (NASI, 2003, table 5, p. 14) In my view, the 
FECA program operates much like an exclusive state or provincial workers’ 
compensation fund, but just for federal workers. Therefore, I have compared FECA 
performance with both U.S. and Canadian workers’ compensation systems.  
 The “Program Effectiveness Study” that I participated in was funded by the 
Employment Standards Administration and was designed to provide an outside review of 
program performance. The Statement of Work indicated: 
The study should produce insightful analyses and useful recommendations 
to enable top Employment Standards Administration and OWCP  
management to assess FECA program effectiveness in the context of  
Federal government standards for strategic planning and performance 




We had considerable difficulty in securing performance measures that were comparable 
to those available from other workers’ compensation systems. This was not unexpected, 
as each workers’ compensation system in the world has evolved under a different set of 
statutory provisions, legal interpretations, and administrative rules.  It was further 
complicated in this case by the fact that OWCP was in the process of converting to a new 
data system for the FECA program. So we were somewhat frustrated at what we were 
able to accomplish in terms of performance measure comparisons.  
 
Promptness of Payment 
 However, there are a few comparisons that you should see. First is the promptness 
of payment issue. When workers are injured, maintaining an uninterrupted stream of 
income is one of their major concerns. Workers’ compensation systems have not 
generally demonstrated good results on this dimension of performance.  
Figure 1 shows the promptness of payment results for 12 U.S. states that are 
included in the CompScope™ series of publications of the Workers Compensation 
Research Institute (WCRI) in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The typical elapsed time from 
date of injury to the first income replacement payment is 63 days, with a range from 50 
days in Massachusetts to 78 days in North Carolina. Only about 45 percent of wage-loss 
claims see their first payment within 21 days, according to the most recent WCRI study.  

















































Exhibit 1  Average Calendar Days from Date of Injury to First Indemnity Payment 
(WCRI CompScopeTM States ) 
SOURCE: Telles, Wang, Tanabe, 2004. 
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Figure 2 shows the same measurement for the Canadian Provincial systems. The 
promptness of payment ranges from about 22 days in Alberta, British Columbia, and 
Nova Scotia to 50 days in Prince Edward Island, with an average around 30 to 35 days. 



























 The situation under FECA is not directly comparable to these results because of 
the Continuation of Pay (COP) provision of the statute. Injured federal workers can elect 
to have their normal pay continued for up to 45 days following injury. If a claim for 
compensation is filed subsequently, OWCP processes the claim for workers’ 
compensation wage replacement payments. Figure 3 shows one of the performance 
measures that OWCP uses to assess this dimension of performance. They seek to process 
90 percent of traumatic claims within 45 days, 80 percent of claims within 90 days for 
non-traumatic injuries, and 70 percent of “extended” claims within 180 days. Figure 3 
indicates that from 92 to over 98 percent of traumatic claims are adjudicated within 45 
days, depending upon the District Office. Non-traumatic claims and extended claims take 
significantly longer, but generally achieve the FECA performance standards. However, it 
is important to remember this is after the COP period, during which the injured worker  
Figure 2   Average Calendar Days from Injury to First Payment Issued—Canadian 
Provincial Systems 
SOURCE:  AWCBC, 2003. 




















































































receives his or her regular salary. Unfortunately, we do not have a measure of the 
distribution of timeliness of payment, but it seems likely that the average delay in 
payment would be comparable to the workers’ compensation systems reported above.  
 
Duration of Disability 
 OWCP was not able to provide us with duration of payment statistics that were 
comparable with those available from other systems, but they were able to match up on 
one important indicator of durations. Figure 4 shows the percentage of wage-loss 
claimants that are receiving benefits at the end of the second calendar year following their 
injury. This provides a rough indicator of the number of long-term claims. Figure 4 
shows considerable variability among the Canadian provincial systems. The range is from 







Figure 3   Percent of FECA Traumatic Claims Adjudicated within 45 Days by 
District Office 












































 Figure 5 shows a comparable figure for FECA claims by District Office. As 
shown in the figure, the percent of lost-time claims that are receiving payments at the end 
of the second calendar year following the injury is roughly comparable to the Canadian 
numbers, ranging from 1.8 percent to 4.8 percent. It is important to mention that in 
neither case do we know if the claimant was continuously in payment status since the 
injury; this is a snapshot only. However, it does not appear that FECA claims last 
significantly longer than those in Canadian workers’ compensation systems. 










Figure 4    Percentage of Lost-Time Claims Receiving Benefits After Two Years – 
2001 Injuries 









































































 Thus far I have shown that FECA performance seems pretty typical of other 
workers’ compensation systems. But there is another measure that I particularly want to 
bring to your attention. OWCP measures one part of their overall program impact with 
the best indicator that I have seen, lost production days. Under the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA), OWCP developed the lost production days (LPD) 
performance measure, which combines the incidence and duration of injuries into a single 
indicator. I regard this as the best outcome measure that I have encountered in the 
workers’ compensation world because it captures the desired outcome, minimizing the 









Figure 5    Percent of Lost-Time Cases Receiving Benefits after Two 
Years―2001 Injuries 
SOURCE:  OWCP 
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SOURCE: Adapted from ICF Consulting, 2004. 
 
 
Figure 6 shows that OWCP has driven the lost production day rate down by one-
third in the past decade. They have done this with a disability management program 
called Quality Case Management (QCM), which is applied to new wage-loss claims that 
have no specific return-to-work date. LPD includes the COP days as well as the wage-
replacement payment days under FECA, so it is a solid attempt to measure the amount of 
work time being lost due to injury and illness.  
 
Conclusions 
 I was aware in a general sense that the GAO had been critical of the 
administration of the FECA program. And I was aware that the Postal Service had 
particular problems with workers’ compensation issues. So, I accepted the role of Subject 
Matter Expert for the FECA Program Effectiveness Study at ICF Consulting with some 
trepidation. But I felt that it was essential that the study be informed by a broader 
workers’ compensation experience if a credible and useful evaluation was to be done.  
In the event, I was pleasantly surprised by the level of policy development, 
commitment to plan, and the goal orientation of OWCP in administering FECA. I was 
particularly impressed with the field visit I made to the Dallas office. Of course, I did not 
speak with a random sample of employees, as they were hand-picked by management, 
but I was struck by the high level of understanding they had of the overall mission and 
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their individual part in it. Their customer orientation was also greater than I had expected 
beforehand.  
I also found that OWCP relies on their strategic plan and annual performance 
plans in a way that would make the authors of GPRA proud. The plans are specific, 
performance is measurable, and the goals are taken very seriously. I have already 
mentioned the lost-work-day measure. That is an example of how OWCP has advanced 
the state of the art in workers’ compensation performance measurement.  
So my conclusion is that OWCP is doing a very good job of administering FECA. 
Of course there are areas that could be improved, and we tried to identify those in the ICF 
report. Workers’ compensation systems are very complex organisms, with lots of hidden 
interconnections and subtle influences. It is very difficult to do workers’ compensation 
reform and I would urge you to be cautious in your approach to change or reform the 
program. We must always remember that the FECA program serves the interests of both 
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